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Abstract 
We review and examine three market-based instruments for addressing the challenge of 
climate change: emission trading, emission taxes, and hybrid instruments.  Our main 
contribution is the illustration and comparison of these instruments using recent results 
from theoretical research and practical policy experience.  Hybrid policies that aim to 
combine taxes and permits emerge as a promising way forward. An additional 
contribution is that we also comment on two other related concepts, namely, innovation 
strategies and prediction markets.  For the former, we show that, to make economic 
sense, the much publicized Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
has to rely on the same basic tool as the other instruments, namely, relative prices.  For 
the latter, we discuss how prediction markets can complement traditional scenario 
analysis by experts.  They are likely to improve the practical implementation of all 
previously discussed methods.   
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1 Introduction 
Unabated climate change threatens to fundamentally change and indeed worsen quality 
of life on this planet: Measures of global temperature show that average temperature has 
augmented by about 0.74 degrees Celsius (°C) in the last 100 years, while the number 
and the frequency of extreme weather events like heat waves, meagreness, strong 
rainfalls and tropical storms has increased.  For a scenario of no mitigation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the increase of the global average temperature is 
estimated to be around 0.2°C per decade (IPCC 2007).  In November 2006 the Stern 
Review (Stern 2006) presented a dramatic scenario that could happen if nothing changes 
in the context of climate protection.  The concentration of GHG in the atmosphere is 
about 430 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxid (CO2), compared to 280 ppm CO2 
before the Industrial Revolution.  This concentration leads to an increase of global 
temperature by more than 0.5°C and will lead to a further increase of at least 0.5°C over 
the next few decades.  If annual emissions do not increase above today’s rate the GHG 
concentration will reach 550 ppm which will probably lead to an increase in global 
temperature by more than 2°C (Stern 2006).  To stabilize the GHG concentration at 550 
ppm the global emissions will have to decrease by about 25% above today’s level.  For 
a stabilisation at 450 ppm the decrease will have to be 70% until the year 2050 (Stern 
2006).1  Similarly, the IPCC predicts scenarios of a slow increase in globally averaged 
surface temperature between 1.1 and 2.9°C and scenarios of an extreme increase 
between 2.4 and 6.4°C for the 21st century (IPCC 2007). A stabilization of the GHG in 
the atmosphere between 445 and 535 ppm CO2 in 2030 would cost maximally about 3% 
of the global GNP.  In the third IPCC’s assessment report an increase of global 
temperature by 1°C was equated with a global loss of about US$ 214 trillion over the 
next fifty years.  In the year 2050 alone, damages of about 2 trillion US$ have to be 
expected (IPCC 2001).2  Of course, there is great uncertainty attached to these 
                                                 
1 For a critical discussion of the Stern Report concerning issues of the rate of discount and cost-benefit- 
analysis see Tol (2006) and Nordhaus (2006). 
2 Although climate change is a global problem, its impacts are often best appreciated by policymakers and 
citizens alike when broken down into effects for their own country.  To illustrate the impact of climate 
change in Europe to readers in Asia, some results for Austria and Germany shall be considered by way of 
example: Vienna is faced with a doubling of tropical days above 30°C daily high temperature within the 
next 50 years.  The frequency of higher maximum temperatures has increased in Vienna in the period of 
1951-2000 compared to the period 1901-1950.  The Schmittenhöhe (a well-known ski area) on the other 
hand is faced with a reduction of ice days with daily high temperature below 0°C by one third (Kromp-
Kolb 2003).  Numbers for Germany show that the increasing numbers of natural disasters will lead to 
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estimates, but Weitzman (2009) shows that the economic consequences of fat-tailed 
structural uncertainty (along with unsureness about high-temperature damages) can 
readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate-change policy analysis, thus 
calling for urgent action.   
Because of the importance of the problem, much literature has dealt with optimal 
ways to address climate change with economic tools.  It has long been recognized that 
command and control instruments (like fixed standards over inputs, outputs or 
technologies or location controls) are inadequate to obtain the desired reduction of 
emissions in cost-minimizing ways.  Therefore, we focus on market-based instruments 
that hold the promise of cost-effectiveness.   
This paper reviews and investigates the theoretical setup and practical workings of 
three different ways of possible actions against climate change, reveals operating 
experience.  The main contribution of the paper is that it reviews, following the same 
criteria for all instruments, and drawing on the most recent available findings, all three 
of these basic instruments.  While some reviews of individual systems are available, 
there exists, at least to our knowledge no current article that compares all three systems 
in one place.  But such a comparison is important because using a partial approach it is 
relatively easy to critique (or favour) one system not keeping in mind that it may 
dominate (or be dominated by) other systems on another dimension.   We study tradable 
permits, emission taxes (and subsidies), and a hybrid between permits and taxes.  We 
cover the basic workings of emission trading and emission taxes (subsidies for 
reductions) only rather briefly as a lot of literature is available on them.  The third 
instrument – less known in Europe but important in the policy discussion in the US – is 
a hybrid instrument that combines trade and tax systems to optimize the advantages the 
two former systems have. The recent experience in Europe is of significant interest also 
for the Asian economies.  We argue that the European Emission Trading System (ETS) 
has likely failed in achieving efficiency in its first phase – too many permits were 
allocated for free.  This resulted in too high emissions in the ETS sector and produced 
additional burden to mitigate pollution in the non-ETS sector.  It may also have led to a 
lacking incentive to engage in emissions trading on the firm level.  Hybrid policies are 
likely to be attractive for future policy adjustments because they allow scarce initial 
                                                                                                                                               
damages of about 137 billion Euros until the year 2050 (Kemfert and Praetorius 2005).  A study by the 
ETH Zurich and Swiss Re found that the damages through winter storms in Europe will increase until 
2085 up to 68% from 1975 values (SwissRe 2006).    
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allocations of permits while still giving sufficient safety to industry, should abatement 
costs turn out to be unexpectedly high.   
Our second contribution is that we challenge a much-publicized approach focusing 
on technological progress.  The governments of Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea and the US are in favour of this approach as a complement to the Kyoto 
protocol.  They have documented their preference for this approach recently through the 
founding of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP).  
Because of the dual characteristics of this strategy – technological progress and 
international diffusion – we refer to this approach as the innovation and cooperation 
strategy.3  Little specific information is available yet on this partnership, and it is to 
some extent still obscure what exactly is the operational approach that is to be taken.  
What is clear after our analysis, however, is that this approach, too, will have to rely on 
a working price system. 
Because all policy tools are strongly affected by uncertainty and difficulties to 
predict future outcomes, we also propose to establish a “prediction market” for future 
technologies.  On such a market, claims on the likelihood of various technological 
innovations are traded, thus using the aggregate knowledge of all market participants in 
addition to relying on estimates of policymakers or a few experts.   
 
We begin in section 2 with an explanation and evaluation of the different economic 
instruments that support the fight against climate change.  The emphasis here is on 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Section 3 takes account of the instruments with respect to 
several additional important dimensions, including ecological effectiveness and political 
feasibility.  In section 4, we focus on the issue of uncertainty and propose prediction 
markets as an effective complement to existing ways of forecasting the future.  Section 
5 concludes.  
2 Overview of market-based methods to fight climate change 
In contrast to many textbooks and general surveys, we especially direct our attention to 
issues relevant to Europe in order to see how the policies implemented fit with the 
recommendations of economic theory; this in turn can then enrich our discussion of 
                                                 
3 There are other instruments that we do not discuss.  Perhaps the biggest omission is that we do not 
further deal with carbon sequestration and reforesting.  We refer the reader to Lecoq and Chomitz (2001), 
Lubowski et al. (2006), Stavins (1999) and Stavins and Richards (2005). 
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policy not only for Europe but also for other countries, including countries in Asia.  
Because of the prominence of the debate in the US, but not in Europe and in Asia, we 
spend considerable time laying out the operation mode and crucial issues of 
implementation of a hybrid policy.  At the end of the section, we discuss a strategy that 
focuses on innovation and cooperation.  Although this strategy is advertised as a new 
approach by the APP, at least from the currently available documentation of that 
partnership, the strategy appears to be consistent with and indeed a logical corollary of 
the other three approaches.  
2.1 Emission trading 
Emission trading is one of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto-Protocol and shall 
therefore play an important role in reaching international climate targets.  The Kyoto-
Protocol’s provision for an international cap-and-trade system paves the way for the 
implementation of the regional emission trading system in Europe (Stavins 2008).  One 
important point why emission trading was chosen to help reach the Kyoto-Targets is 
that, like taxes, it allows emissions to be reduced where it is cheapest for the economy, 
i.e., it is cost-effective (Dales 1968; Montgomery 1972).  In a framework where permits 
are allocated for free, an emission trading system does not involve transfers from the 
private sector to the government vis-à-vis an emission tax approach.  
The basic setup is that a regulator sets an emission cap for a certain sector.  The level 
of this cap depends on the target that should be achieved.  The more ambitious the 
target, the lower the overall cap is.  When the overall cap is set, each participator - the 
individual firms - will get a certain allocation of emission allowances.  This allocation 
can happen in two different ways.  The first one which is used in the EU ETS is 
grandfathering.  With this method, emission rights are mainly allocated on base of past 
emissions of each company.  The alternative is to auction off allowances.  We discuss 
these two approaches below.  
In general, the EU ETS covers installations which are combustion plants, oil 
refineries, coke ovens, iron and steels plants and factories producing cement, glass, 
lime, brick, ceramics and pulp and paper.  Sectors or industries which are not covered 
by the scheme, e.g. the private sector, transport or the building industry, have to be 
regulated by other (national) abatement measures in order to reach each national 
emission reduction target.  To illustrate the quantities involved, Table 1 shows the 
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allocated emission allowances of some large European companies.  It becomes clear 
that because of the size of the market even a low or mediate price of allowances is 
substantial, as is the potential cost for each individual company.   
 
Table 1: Emission allowances allocated to some European companies 
  Allocated allowances   
(in thousand tons CO2) 
 
Sector Company 2005-2007 2008-2012 by National Allocation Plan of 
Steel 
ThyssenKrupp Stahl AG 48,190 98,552 Germany 
Voestalpine 34,069 56,710 Austria 
Electricity 
EnBW Kraftwerke AG 30,237 33,880 Germany 
Vattenfall Europe Generation AG & Co. KG 198,607 187,887 Germany 
Verbund 10,033 12,519 Austria 
EdF 64,535 80,835 France 
Refinery 
OMV 8,303 14,960 Austria 
Shell 10,616 25,131 UK 
BP 11,582 25,103 UK 
Esso 10,871 16,591 UK 
 
Source: NAPs of the different countries 
 
To put the role of the emission trading program into perspective with the overall 
amount of emissions, it is instructive to consider the overall amount of CO2 emissions, 
which are shown in Table 2.  Emission trading in the European Union only covers a part 
of these emissions.  In the EU-ETS, emission allowances for approximately 2.2 billion 
tons of CO2 were allocated per year for the period 2005-2007 while within the period 
2008-2012 emission allowances for approximately 1.9 billion tons of CO2 - without 
accounting for changes in the captured installations and sectors by the scheme - have 





Table 2: CO2 emissions of different regions (in million tons) 
Year World EU-15 EU-27 China India Japan South 
Korea 
1995 23,108 3,277 4,141 3,013 916 1,305 374 
1996 23,903 3,355 4,242 3,216 999 1,328 408 
1997 24,118 3,301 4,154 3,157 1,042 1,322 424 
1998 24,905 3,347 4,142 3,022 1,070 1,287 364 
1999 24,083 3,321 4,076 2,735 1,140 1,318 396 
2000 24,677 3,349 4,100 2,740 1,155 1,344 431 
2001 24,918 3,418 4,179 2,800 1,181 1,341 438 
2002 25,874 3,409 4,155 3,532 1,226 1,328 446 
2003 27,020 3,488 4,263 4,146 1,264 1,376 454 
2004 28,424 3,508 4,283 4,881 1,343 1,391 466 
2005 29,430 3,486 4,258 5,380 n.a. 1,401 n.a. 
2006 30,047 3,466 4,258 5,944 n.a. 1,381 n.a. 
2007 30,892 n.a. n.a. 6,389 n.a. 1,393 n.a. 
 
Source: Eurostat, IWR (Internationales Wirtschaftsforum Regenerative Energien), Umweltbundesamt, United Nations Statistics 
Division  
 
The second way to allocate the allowances is via complete or partial auctioning.  
Companies bid for the amount of emissions they would probably need and have to buy 
the certificates.  This is generally seen as the preferred way of doing the allocation.  (For 
an overview about the concepts of grandfathering and auctioning we refer the reader to 
Cramton and Kerr (2002).)  First, auctions are more cost-effective in the presence of 
certain kinds of transaction costs.  Second, the revenue raised can be used to reduce 
other distortions.  Note also that instruments such as tradeable permits can create entry 
barriers that raise product prices, reduce the real wage, and exacerbate pre-existing labor 
supply distortions.  This effect can be offset if the government auctions the permits, 
retains the scarcity rents, and recycles the revenue by reducing pre-existing distortionary 
taxes (Goulder and Bovenberg 1996).4  Third, auctions provide greater incentives for 
firms to develop substitutes of CO2-intensive technologies.  Fourth, due to the revenue 
raised by auctions, administrative agencies may have a bigger incentive to monitor 
                                                 
4  In economic literature, this mechanism is called the “Double Dividend”.  The “Double Dividend” of an 
emission tax or an emission trading system results on the one hand from reducing emissions (ecological 
dividend) and on the other hand from increasing welfare via using the revenues from the tax or the 
auctioning of permits to diminish existing tax distortions (economic dividend).  For an overview 
regarding the double dividend hypothesis the reader is referred to Goulder (1995).  
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compliance (Ackermann and Stewart 1985).  Finally, grandfathering can lead 
unregulated firms to increase their emissions in order to maximize the pollution rights 
that they obtain if there is a transition to a market-based system (Dewees 1983).  For all 
these reasons, an auction of emission rights may be preferable to grandfathering which 
could lead to the conclusion that the EU-ETS is likely to be highly inefficient currently 
on this dimension.  
In practice, and taking into account the political process, the auctioning of permits 
may not be preferred to grandfathering.  One common assumption is that the regulated 
industries would oppose auctioning.  But this is not the only possibility.  For example, 
Lai (2008) considers the lobbying behaviour of interest groups and shows that industrial 
lobbies may endorse an auction while environmental lobby groups may support 
grandfathering of permits. In this framework, a cost-minimizing industry endowed with 
few free permits favors an auction because this allocation rule strengthens its political 
influence and empowers the industry to lobby for a greater share of the emission cap or 
rather a higher amount of permits and in consequence minimize the permit price.5  
Within the revision and the preparation for a post Kyoto period of the EU-ETS one 
central point is the intensification of auctioning allowances from 2013.  The proposal of 
the EU-Commission concerning the revision of the EU-ETS considers a replacement of 
the limited use of auctioning allowances (a 5%-cap in the first and a 10%-cap in the 
second trading period) by an auctioning of at least 60% of the total number of 
allowances which consists of a full auctioning approach within the power sector and a 
partial auctioning of 20% for energy intensive industries.6   
When the initial allocation is done trading can start.  Companies which have more 
certificates in their portfolio than they need - net suppliers - can sell these certificates on 
the market to companies – net purchasers - which have to cover their emissions with 
additional permits.  Thus, the certificate price results from the interaction of the supply 
of certificates (the emission cap) and the demand behaviour of emitting firms (the 
                                                 
5 Lai (2008) shows as well that grandfathered permits will raise the industrial endowment effect and 
strengthen the environmental group’s lobbying power. Hence, in the case that the emission cap is defined 
in subsequent stage, environmentalists will support grandfathered permits within this public choice 
context. The empirical analysis of Svendsen (1999) arrives at the conclusion that environmental lobby 
groups in the US advocate grandfathering in order to arrange stricter reduction targets. 
6 We cannot deal with the whole revision process concerning the centralization and harmonization of cap 
setting and allocation rules, the enlargement of the scope, the competitiveness of covered sectors and the 
integration of third countries to increase the effectiveness of the EU-ETS in this paper.  For an overview, 
we refer the reader to Ellerman and Joskow (2008) and Convery (2009).  
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aggregate marginal abatement costs).  In principle, in the presence of perfect 
information, no transaction costs, a perfectly competitive trading market and no 
governments’ interventions trading will result in the economically efficient outcome 
independently of the initial distribution of permits (Montgomery 1972), because 
marginal abatement costs are equated in any equilibrium.7  Conversely, this 
independence result does not necessarily hold when there is uncertainty (and firms are 
risk-averse), when there are transaction costs, when some firms have market power in 
either allowance or product markets or when firms receive different regulatory 
treatment.  Also, when some market participants are not cost-minimizing or when 
current allocations are tied to production in previous periods, allocations may matter 
(Hahn and Stavins 2009).      
Some recent work has considered to which extent emission markets operate 
efficiently.  An active market has developed for allowances on the European CO2 
market (Parsons, Ellerman and Feilhauer 2009); this liquidity is a necessary condition 
for market efficiency.  One consideration in this context concerns transaction costs.  The 
existence of transaction costs can lead to a wedge between market participants’ 
marginal costs.  Thus, allowance prices diverge from the zero transaction cost 
competitive equilibrium.8  Another question is whether prices are, in fact, unpredictable, 
as the efficient markets hypothesis suggests.  Applying technical analysis and naïve 
forecasts, Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) show that three of the most important spot 
and future markets for European CO2 allowances deviate from the weak form of market 
efficiency.  That is, returns of CO2 allowances exhibit predictability and simple trading 
                                                 
7 By contrast, Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) point out that the presumption that equal marginal abatement 
costs are the correct condition for efficiency is not strictly correct.  The reason for this is that, simply, a 
dollar to a person in the developing world does not have the same welfare implications as a dollar to a 
developed world person.  What matters are the real opportunity costs.  Formally, the authors find that 
Pareto efficiency requires the marginal cost of abatement in each country to be inversely related to the 
country's marginal valuation for the private good.  This has strong policy implications: If richer countries 
have a lower marginal valuation of the private good, then at a Pareto-efficient allocation, they should 
have a larger marginal cost of abatement than the lower-income countries.  With diminishing returns to 
abatement, this implies that they should push abatement further.  Summarizing, the allocation of property 
rights in a tradable permit system is important for efficiency, not merely for distribution, if environmental 
quality has a direct impact on wellbeing and marginal valuations of private goods differ strongly across 
countries.   
8 Cason and Gangadharan (2003) use laboratory experiments to show that in a setting with decreasing 
marginal transaction costs the prices and traded quantities vary less from the efficient level if the initial 
distribution of allowances is not accomplished cost-effectively. The reason is that a more deficient 
distribution of allowances is in need of a higher transaction volume to accomplish the cost-effective 
allocation which induces lower marginal transaction cost in a framework of decreasing transaction costs.  
Furthermore, in the case of constant marginal transaction costs, transaction prices and traded quantities 
are independent of the incipient endowment. 
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methods can be applied to generate significant risk-adjusted profits.  These findings 
may be traced back to the facts that the EU ETS currently still suffers from immaturity 
and features constraints regarding short-selling and banking.9  A third consideration is 
the intertemporal efficiency, i.e., the link between spot and futures prices.  Accounting 
for price dynamics of CO2 future contracts of the EU ETS, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner 
(2009) find that spot and futures prices were linked by the cost-and-carry approach 
between December 2005 and the end of the first trading period.   
In the long run, direct and indirect linking of the EU-ETS with other regional or 
national systems will offer an opportunity to increase liquidity of and participation in 
the market for tradable allowances, thus improving the functioning of the market.  By 
an intensified linking of the EU-ETS any given global reduction target could be 
implemented at lowest cost (Jaffe and Stavins 2007). Further, the linking of separate 
tradable permit systems could form an important element of a post-2012 climate policy 
architecture and endorse negotiations about ecologically more effective reduction 
targets (Jaffe et al. 2009).  In the short term the EU-ETS has focused on (indirect) 
linkage with emission reduction credit programs like the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto - Protocol.  
2.2 Emission Tax 
The emission tax is a near relative of emission trading.10  While emission trading 
focuses on the amount of emissions which are allowed in general, the emission tax 
focuses on the price side of this relation.  As the different companies have different 
abatement costs they will react in different ways to an emission tax.  Some companies 
will reduce more than others.  If the tax is higher than the marginal costs of abating, at 
least a part of the emissions will be reduced by a company.  This will happen as long as 
the tax rate is as high as the costs of abating the next unit of emissions.  If the tax rate is 
chosen in a way that is as high as the price would be in an emission trading scenario, 
then there would be no difference between these two ways of climate protection.  
                                                 
9 Ellerman and Montero (2002) empirically evaluate the temporal efficiency of the U.S. Acid Rain 
Program allowing for trading and banking. They find that in contrast to the general perception of 
excessive banking in this program banking worked efficiently.  
10 Subsidies essentially work symmetrically, and we do not explicitly discuss them here.  Olsson et al. 
(2006) discuss them in the European context and provide experimental evidence on their competitive 
impacts. 
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Calculating the optimal tax rate (or the optimal level of emissions with a tradable 
permit program) of course requires substantial knowledge about benefits and costs of 
mitigating emissions.  Applied to the context of climate change, what is the optimal 
policy?  Cline (2004) found a path for optimal carbon tax and optimal percent cutback 
in emissions with the DICE99CL model.  He found that an optimal abatement strategy 
should be very aggressive with an emission cutback of about 35-40% in the early stages, 
increasing to 50% by 2100 and 63% by 2200.  Therefore adequate carbon taxes would 
be necessary which should be about US$170 per ton around the year 2005, rising up to 
US$246 by 2025 and US$367 by 2055.  It is obvious that these numbers are of a 
different order of magnitude than what is being discussed right now for possible CO2 
taxes.  
2.3 Hybrid systems combining emission trading and emission taxes 
The prices which could be seen on the European CO2 market are of a different order of 
magnitude than the prices calculated by Cline (2004).  In the following Figure 1, we 
present the Intraday Spot Price from the start of emission trading at the EEX (European 
Energy Exchange) and BlueNext on March 9th 2005 up to the most recently available 
data. 
As one can see from the data presented in this figure, during the year 2006 the range 
of the emission permit price has varied between €10 and €30, which is far away from 
the emission prices that have been calculated by Cline (2004).  Even in that time period, 
we can thus conclude that the EU-ETS does not achieve social (or allocative) efficiency.  
The cost-effectiveness of the reduction may also have been constrained simply because 
little reduction of emissions was required.  Trading did take place (in fact, trading 
volume in the ETS rose more quickly than it did at the start of the SO2-permit trading 
program under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 system) but in the absence of a 
baseline of how much trading should have occurred, it is hard to evaluate the outcome.  
The price path of CO2 permits in the EU is not only noteworthy for its level but also 
for its highly volatile behaviour.  Despite the fairly low expectations of maximum price 
caps of about €15 the permit price climbed up to €30 until spring 2006.  A few days 
later, the information that the market as a whole was “long permits” began to circulate, 
meaning that too many permits were allocated.  This emerging of an overallocation in 
the trading sector of the EU-ETS resulted in a price collapse unusual for commodity 
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markets.  This episode illustrates that there is significant uncertainty in the market.  Part 
of it probably has to do with the fact that emission trading is a new policy for Europe, 
but part is inherent in the way the market is set up.  Because of banning the possibility 
of transferring permits from one trading period to another by most member states and 
the resulting lost in value of the CO2 permits with the new trading period in 2008, the 
price effects following from over allocation were intensified.11  (See Parsons et al. 
(2009) for a discussion of this problematic design feature.)  Nonetheless, even without 
these institutional features there is significant uncertainty.  The spot price ranging 
initially between €22 and €27 illustrates the increased value of CO2 permits generated 
by stricter allocation caps for the second trading phase. 
 

































CO2 Spot Price EEX CO2 Spot Price BlueNext
 
Source: BlueNext, EEX 
 
The key assumption that drives the equivalence between emission permits and 
emission taxes in the previous two sections is the absence of uncertainty.  In particular, 
the regulator was assumed to know exactly what upper bound to set on emissions or 
                                                 
11 The so called banking of emission allowances shifts permit trading into future trading periods and 
consequently represents an instrument of risk manangement with respect to drastic price changes and 
allowance shortages (Maeda 2004).  For an analysis of the reduction of abatement costs via a banking of 
permits in the Kyoto framework, see van Steenberghe (2005).      
12 On January 21st 2010, the exchange rate was €1 ≈ US$1,41.  
 13
what tax rate to set in order to achieve the social optimum.  The price is defined by the 
tax in that way that the optimal level of abatement is generated while the quantity-based 
approach can be used to fix the optimal quantity in order to generate the market price.   
In practice, however, uncertainty is rampant.  Indeed, both the (marginal) costs of 
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and the (marginal) benefits of avoiding climate 
change are highly uncertain.  For example, Pizer (2002) calculates that the marginal cost 
of achieving the 1990 emissions level in 2010 would involve a marginal cost between 
US$0 and US$180 per ton Carbon13 (for a 95% confidence interval).  The marginal 
benefits are approximately constant independent of the reduction of emissions, and are 
between US$0 and US$24 per ton Carbon.  
As Weitzman (1974) shows in his seminal paper, price instruments (like taxes) and 
quantity instruments (like emission permits) behave asymmetrically in the presence of 
benefit and/or cost uncertainty.14  In this setting, an environmental agency has to choose 
the instrument of pollution control ex ante with regard to the expected degree of welfare 
being generated ex-post.  Weitzman’s main result is that taxes minimize the deadweight 
loss from choosing the wrong policy if the marginal costs of abatement are steeper than 
the marginal benefits, while emission permits are preferred otherwise.15  Because of the 
features of cost and benefit functions in the context of climate change, some researchers 
therefore argue for the superiority of taxes as a policy instrument for climate change.  
Intuitively, because marginal costs are assumed to be steeper than marginal benefits, 
taxes are preferable because they put a fixed upper bound on the costs firms will have to 
bear.  By contrast, emission permits may produce, in equilibrium, an extremely high 
price that may create substantial overall efficiency losses.16   
In a dynamic setting, Biglaiser et al. (1996) show that under the assumption of 
complete information a quantity based approach may not induce a the social optimum 
even if the market is perfectly competitive because an optimal system of tradeable 
permits exhibits time inconsistency.  By contrast, tax approaches to regulate pollution 
may be able to achieve the social optimum and feature time consistency.  Montero 
(2002) shows that with incomplete enforcement and cost and benefit uncertainty, a 
                                                 
13 One ton carbon corresponds to 3.67 tons CO2. 
14 We comment on other differences below.  
15 The analysis of Adar and Griffin (1976) using quadratic cost und benefit functions provides the same 
results while Weitzman’s findings are based on approximately quadratic cost and benefit functions.  
16 Newell and Pizer (2003), for example, find that taxes generate up to nearly 5 times the expected 
welfare gains of tradable permits in a 40-year horizon. 
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quantity instrument performs relatively better than a price instrument; when marginal 
benefit and cost curves having the same slope, the quantity instrument should be 
preferred.  The reason for this preference is that incomplete enforcement is endogenous 
to the actual cost of control.  Under incomplete enforcement unexpectedly high costs 
cause non-compliance of some firms, and thus the advantage of prices over quantities is 
mitigated.  On the other hand, Newell and Pizer (2003) find that in a setting of stock 
pollution with rising optimal stock levels the more efficient control is often provided by 
a price-based approach.  Overall, there is no definitive advantage of either prices or 
quantities; the relative dominance depends on the circumstances.    
Economists have long considered ways of combining the advantages of emission 
trading with the advantages of emission taxes (Roberts and Spence 1976).17  One such 
hybrid instrument uses certificates as the main instrument, but there is a backup system 
that should protect the participating companies from an extreme increase in prices for 
the permits.  This backup system works with a so called “safety valve” that gives 
companies the possibility to buy permits from the national authority at a fixed price that 
is usually higher than the expected market price.  For the case that the market price does 
not develop as expected, companies have an option to buy certificates at a fixed price. 
This makes it easier for companies’ calculations as they have an overview of the 
maximum costs they may be faced with.  Companies can choose whether to buy permits 
at the market or to buy them from the national authority, but their choice will depend on 
the market price.  But if the market price is higher than the trigger price companies will 
pay the trigger price, to the national authority which can be seen as a tax per unit of 
emission.  As long as the price of the permits is below the trigger price the system will 
work like a trading scheme providing cost efficiency with uncertain costs and a fixed 
amount of emissions.  If the trigger price is reached because of higher abatement costs 
than anticipated a so called “safety valve” is provided and the system changes to a tax 
scheme with fixed costs but an uncertain outcome of emissions.  Roberts and Spence 
(1976) show that the simultaneous implementation of price and quantity approaches 
                                                 
17 We do not deal with a combination of marked-based instruments with environmental standards for 
certain regions here.  The aspect of a combination of permit trading and ambient concentration limits is 
considered by Krupnick et al. (1983) and McGartland and Oates (1985).  The SO2-permit trading program 
under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 and the usage of a tradable permit system for NOx and SO2 
under the Regional Clean Air Markets (RECLAIM) in Los Angeles can be cited as real implementation of 
a combination between a tradable permit approach and environmental standards (Snyder Bennear and 
Stavins 2007). 
 15
minimizes expected total costs in contrast to the isolated usage of a price-based o 
quantity-based instrument.  The application of this hybrid system can be interpreted as 
protection of each instrument against the malfunction of the other.18  
Figure 2 shows how the hybrid system works (cf. Jacoby and Ellerman (2000)).  The 
national authority allocates permits in the amount of Q1.  Marginal social costs of 
emissions are described by MSC.  If the marginal abatement costs are low, as is shown 
by the marginal abatement cost curve 1 (MAC1), the market price for certificates will be 
P1. But if marginal abatement costs turn out to be high as is shown by the marginal 
abatement cost curve 2 (MAC2), the resulting market price would be P2.  This is much 
higher than expected, leading to an efficiency loss, because the quantity of permits 
should have been higher.  This is where the hybrid policy comes in.  In this policy, 
companies can buy additional permits from the national authority without limit at a 
safety valve price PSV, and overall costs will be much lower as in an emission trading 
system.  Due to the higher level of abatement costs emissions are abated to level QH and 
permits in the amount of QH - Q1 are bought.   
Finally, the level of emission under the hybrid system QH will be slightly higher 
compared to the optimal level of emission Q2 which leads to lower total costs under the 
MAC1 and higher social cost of the emission level within the range between QH and Q2. 
The welfare efficiency loss of the hybrid system (the area x – y – z) is less than that 
what would have appeared in the situation without the safety valve (the area in the 
triangle 0 – x – a).   Therefore, the hybrid system gives companies more security 
concerning the financial side of the system, because they know a maximum amount of 
costs that will arise if the trigger price comes into play. 
In the economic literature the implementation of a hybrid system lately has been 
seen as an important approach fighting global climate change (Jacoby and Ellerman 
2004; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Pizer 2002).  The efficiency gains from the hybrid 
policy for climate change have been estimated to be substantial.  Pizer (2002) uses a 
modified version of the Nordhaus (1994) DICE model.  It is true that the hybrid policy 
only slightly improves on the pure tax system; the expected social benefits of a global 
policy to combat climate change are about US$300 billion in both cases.  But both the 
                                                 
18 Baumol and Oates (1988) study a hybrid system which allows the firms to sell their permit to the 
government if the price falls below a certain “price floor” which however can back dynamic inefficiencies 
up. 
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tax and the hybrid system are dramatically superior to the optimal tradable permit 
solution, by a factor of five or more.  Thus, given that the hybrid system has a 
significant appeal vis-à-vis the tax system – namely, the ability to flexibly distribute the 
rents associated with emission rights – it appears as a very attractive option indeed.19  
To our knowledge, there is no analysis of the relative gains of this instrument 
specifically for Europe.   
Figure 2: A hybrid system 
 
How high the trigger price should be is a matter of ongoing discussion.  Some argue 
that the trigger price should be high so that it is getting used only in unexpected 
situations, when the demand for emission rights increases as a result of unexpected 
actions.  But if the trigger price is set too high, the basic problem of a deadweight loss 
in the case of unexpectedly high marginal abatement costs arises.  On the other hand, if 
the trigger price is set too low, not all marginal benefits of reducing emissions are 
internalized.  Numerical results confirm this intuition.  For example, Pizer (2002) 
calculates that the optimal trigger price actually is very similar to the optimal tax level.  
                                                 
19 A drawback of this prototypical hybrid system is that it necessitates monetary exchanges between the 
private sector and the government in case the trigger price is reached (which may be seen categorically as 
a bad idea).  Newell et al. (2003) consider policies that replicate the behaviour of the policy without 
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If, in 2010, the same world emissions as in 1990 should be obtained, he calculates that 
the optimal trigger price is around US$20 per ton carbon.20   
2.4 The innovation and cooperation strategy 
We now turn to what at first appears like a completely different way of possible climate 
change policies, but what, in the end turns out not to be a separate instrument on its 
own.  The idea behind this strategy has entered public discussion with the consultation 
of the Asian-Pacific-Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP).  This 
agreement between Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US is 
focusing on a new way to achieve climate protection hand in hand with economic 
performance.  The partners of this agreement want to focus on the development of new 
technologies and an increased cooperation both on developing and distributing these 
technologies.  The idea the governments involved in this partnership had when they 
founded this partnership was that innovation of new technologies reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions which helps them to fulfil their climate protection targets and provide a 
higher level of energy security.  As a side effect of these technology advances, indeed, 
economic theory suggests that only technological progress can boost economic growth 
in the long run.21   
Since July 2008, 123 projects have been registered in which government agencies 
and companies from the sectors of aluminium, buildings and appliances, cement, 
cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and transmission, renewable 
energy and distributed generation and steel are involved.  Some illustrative examples of 
the APP’s project activities include the management of bauxite residue in the 
aluminium production, the promotion of a standardized energy efficient lighting, the 
transformation of waste to fuel in cement kilns, and the improvement of carbon capture 
technology for coal-fired power plants.  Furthermore, it covers the development of 
strategies to guarantee health and safety in coal mining, the implementation of a shared 
                                                 
20 Recall that these estimates are based on what is seen by many as an inefficient goal of emissions 
reductions themselves.  Cline’s (2004)estimates above optimize both the quantity and the price.   
21 This was recognized already in Solow (1956).  Only more recently did economists think about how 
technological progress develops endogenously.  The seminal contribution is Romer (1990), but a huge 
literature, which we cannot review here has since followed.  We refer the reader to Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003) for a comprehensive overview.   
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best practice approach in the power generation sector, and the intensification of the 
usage of solar power and cleaner steel technologies.22   
The basic question, though, is what are the incentives for technological progress?  
Like for any other economic activity, people may have intrinsic incentives, but for most 
entrepreneurs engaging in the business of technological innovation, there is also an 
extrinsic part.  A useful framework for thinking about technological progress has been 
provided by Schumpeter who separated technological progress into three different 
phases.  The first one is called invention and is defined as the phase in which new ideas 
are created.  In the second phase these ideas have to be developed into commercially 
useable products.  This phase is called innovation.  All these innovations can only push 
an economy forward if they are widely used.  This happens in the third phase of the 
cycle of technological change named diffusion. The critical point is that each of these 
phases is guided and regulated by incentives.  Incentives come from outside effects like 
(relative) prices or official regulation.  
One way to interpret the APP is that it wants to give the same relative incentives as 
other, existing policies in Europe and elsewhere, but with a different method.  In 
particular, one interpretation is that it favors rewarding environment-friendly 
technologies rather than punishing environment-hostile technologies.  Economically, 
the effect is the same and the two approaches are isomorphic, but politically, they may 
be worlds apart.  Where the first three approaches discussed in this paper use taxes and 
quantity restrictions, it is likely that the Asia-Pacific partnership would favor research 
subsidies.  They might also consider a policy innovation such as “minimum number of 
inventions bonds” (the rough equivalent of a quantity instrument).23  These instruments 
would be set with very similar goals in mind as discussed before: social efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness.  
Of course, participating countries tend to have different interests concerning 
environmental protection and economic development.  Therefore, as a common 
                                                 
22 Detailed information of the different sectoral projects and outcomes of the 8th Policy and 
Implementation Committee Meeting in October 2009 can be found under 
http://asiapacificpartnership.org/default.aspx.  
23 Recall that an emission permit allows a company to emit a ton of a particular pollution, thus causing 
social damages.  Similarly, with an “invention bond“ a company would be allowed to receive the right to 
use a new technology.  Companies that are not innovative enough to invent themselves are better off 
buying these bonds, leading to a more efficient social allocation.  Clearly, this is rather utopian, but the 
basic principle should apply here.   
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environmental target is missing in contrast to the Kyoto-targets, each country will try to 
maximize its utility, which may inhibit the effectiveness of the Asia-Pacific partnership 
being based so much on cooperation.  Moreover, one problem with subsidies is that they 
can be misappropriated fairly easily.  La Porta et. al (1999) indeed show a positive 
correlation between government transfers and subsidies and corruption, although the 
overall evidence and interpretation of this correlation is less clear.  Buscaglia and van 
Dijk (2003) found that “high levels of corruption are associated with high distortions 
and abuse of discretion in the granting of state subsidies to the private sector”.  Olsson 
et al. (2006) discuss further implementation issues if subsidies were to be used in 
Europe.  One aspect that we cannot deal within this paper is how the international 
diffusion of technological progress is governed.  Difficult issues in industrial 
organization, international intellectual property law, and other areas are relevant here, 
and they have to be analyzed separately.24   
In short, we challenge the view that this is a separately viable economic instrument 
to combat climate change.  Not only is it relatively obscure how precisely this approach 
would be put into operation, but it is also clear that it is practically meaningless without 
a price system that is supported by one of the three core approaches discussed earlier.   
3 Additional criteria for choosing among instruments 
So far, we have discussed the four instruments mainly in the light of efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness considerations.  All market-based instruments are likely to yield cost-
effective solutions, and their efficiency always depends on the degree of information the 
policy maker can secure regarding optimal pollution levels.  In this section, we consider 
additional criteria for choosing among instruments, in particular, ecological 
effectiveness, political feasibility, financial impacts, and dynamic incentives.  It is 
important to evaluate these criteria for all instruments at the same time.  In evaluating 
the instruments, we also draw, on existing experiences especially in Europe.  As 
                                                 
24 Recent work has revealed that a technology transfer from a developed country (north) to a developing 
country (south) in a situation with no-trade the north country will, in equilibrium, and even if the 
technology is transferred free of costs, always like to transfer the technology to the south.  The south will 
always be better off if it accepts the technology. In this case, the global pollution level will always stay 
within the initial levels.  In a second step trade was introduced between north and south and different 
outcomes were found. In this two-commodity model, the north is specialized on the production of the 
non-polluting commodity and south is specialized in the production of the polluting commodity.  The 
north could be better of if it transferred technology but once it decides to transfer than it would be done 
completely.  The technology transfer cannot guarantee a stable global emission level under a trading 
scenario (Mukherjee and Rübbelke 2006). 
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discussed earlier, uncertainty is perhaps the dominating aspect of climate change policy 
and therefore an extremely important criterion for evaluating policy choices.  It 
permeates all the issues discussed in this section.  We have studied one important aspect 
(the question of deadweight losses) above, and we will return to the issue of uncertainty 
again in section 4, where we ask how we can approach it using a market-based 
instrument.   
3.1 Ecological effectiveness 
Ecological effectiveness describes how well an instrument works to reach the 
environmental goal the policy focuses on.  Emission permits and emission taxes, which 
are near relatives to each other, have one of their biggest differences in this point. 
Emission trading sets an overall cap of emission allowances that are supplied to the 
companies which have to take part in the system.  This cap is limiting overall emissions 
from the emission trading sector.  Ecological effectiveness therefore is, at least in 
theory, one hundred percent as no more emissions than allowed should be emitted.  
(That does not mean that one hits the right target – but society is able to achieve it for 
sure.)  As emission trading is a new instrument in European environmental policy not 
much experience has been gained yet.  Experiences in the United States with an SO2 
trading system which started in 1995 have shown that the allowance trading program 
had positive welfare effects, taking into account both ecological and economic aspects, 
with benefits six times greater than costs (Stavins 2003).  As mentioned earlier, while 
the quantity is fixed (at least to the extent that emissions can be properly measured), the 
price of emissions and abatement is uncertain.  
In contrast to an emission trading system, an emission tax system cannot guarantee 
an exact amount of emissions as the outcome.  The reason is that with a fixed price of 
emitting that is set by the tax and unknown marginal abatement costs, the reduction of 
emissions is uncertain.  The reduction can be higher than in a trading system if the tax is 
higher than the market price but the reduction can be lower as well if the tax is below 
the market price.  Ecological effectiveness of a tax system depends on the tax rate which 
should be set ideally with the knowledge of the marginal abatement costs.  Usually 
these costs are only available to each individual company but not to the authority and 
therefore the tax has to be set without this information.  Thus meeting an environmental 
target with a tax is difficult and the tax has to be adapted until the initial target is 
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reached.  This trial and error process will need time and is difficult in a political context 
if the system of emission taxes is not commonly agreed upon under all political parties.  
In other words, the standard, static uncertainty analysis by Weitzman (1974) and others 
that was already discussed above has to be extended by including dynamic aspects.  But 
if the deadweight losses in one period of time turn out, ex post, to have been too high, 
then in the next time period the instrument may be adjusted.  However, even if adjusting 
the tax rate would be socially optimal, this adjustment is not necessarily possible in the 
political process.  In other words, political inertia can be an additional cost of choosing 
the wrong tax rate in the first place.   
Experiences with taxes in Europe have shown different results.  In Norway, for 
example, high carbon taxes have lead to low effects on emissions.  This may be because 
the tax does not work for the sources in which it was levied and was not used for other 
sources where it would have worked (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004).  For Germany 
simulations for the effects of the ecological tax reform have shown that a reduction of 
CO2-emissions can be achieved while still reaching increasing employment.  In the 
model, CO2-emissions are reduced step by step until they are 3 % lower than in the 
business-as-usual scenario without an ecological tax reform in 2010 whereas GDP will 
increase up to nearly 0.5 % and employment will increase around 0.75 % compared to 
the business-as-usual scenario (Kohlhaas 2005). 
The hybrid system combines the trade and the tax systems not only in institutional 
settings but also in the issue of ecological effectiveness.  Thus, the ecological target is 
reached as long as the hybrid system is moving in the trade area of the system. If the 
trigger price rather the safety valve are reached and additional certificates can be bought 
from the national authority the certificate cap is increasing and the ecological target gets 
diluted as the outcome is not clear anymore.  One can see that consequently the 
ecological effectiveness of the hybrid system depends on the setting of the trigger price.  
If the trigger price is set near the market price for emission allowances then a little 
demand increase is sufficient to increase the price for the allowances over the trigger 
price.  In this case, allowances can be bought from the national authority and the 
ecological target is missed.  So the policy should be designed with a trigger price high 
 22
enough that it is only reached in unpredictable situations to keep the focus on the 
environmental effect of the system.25   
Ecological effectiveness is a problematic point in the innovation strategy.  The 
output of research and development, one of the most important points in a good working 
innovation strategy, cannot be easily predicted.  The potential that new inventions have 
to protect the climate are hard to foresee in advance.  It is impossible to say that new 
inventions in the next 10 years will reduce emissions by 50 % because nobody knows 
exactly what environmental protecting potential new inventions will have.  As there are 
no binding goals in this strategy the whole ecological effect will depend on the progress 
of technology, on the intensity of international cooperation, and on the exchange of 
technologies between countries or even companies.  All these aspects are hard to 
predict.  We will return to this issue, and especially the possibility to forecast future 
technologies using market-based tools, in section 4.  
3.2 Political feasibility 
Political feasibility means the acceptance a policy has in the public.  If more (and more 
powerful) people are in favour of a certain policy, it is easier for the political authority 
to implement this policy without compromising their chances for re-election – the latter 
of course being one major incentive for governments in their choice of policy 
instruments.  
One relevant factor influencing the feasibility of a policy is the number of people 
that is affected by the policy.  For example, in the case of a tax this factor is defined by 
the amount of money which costs the tax each individual.  In the case of emissions this 
paper is focusing on, that means how the broad public or the majority of voters are 
affected by emission trading, taxes or other policies.  But as interest groups play an 
important role in political decision making small lobbies may be powerful when it 
comes to negotiations about new political activity.  Representatives of the industry 
sector, which is made up of only few people in comparison to, e.g., the large number of 
workers that are represented by the unions, may have a lot of political power because of 
the capital they represent.  
                                                 
25 Murray et al. (2009) pick up the potentially insufficient ecological effectiveness of a cap-and-trade 
system with a safety valve and suggest an allowance reserve approach. This system provides a fixed price 
ceiling and a maximum number of permits to be issued which means that the ecological target is 
supported by ensuring a quantitative limit of permits.  
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In the case of emission trading as it is used today most people are not directly 
affected.  In Europe only large companies in electricity generation and industry have to 
take part in the emission trading system but small businesses and households are 
excluded.  From this point of view emission trading has a good political enforceability.   
Voters are indirectly affected, however, through increasing prices which are a result of 
the higher costs companies are faced with.  But as it is difficult for consumers to have 
an exact view of the reasons for increasing prices in detail, emission trading can be seen 
as an instrument relatively easily implemented.  Stavins (2007) argues that 
environmental advocacy groups (generally supporting command-and-control 
instruments) strongly prefer tradeable permits vis-à-vis a tax approach because the 
price-based policy generates highly visible cost of environmental protection.  Regarding 
the permit allocation, an allocation without charge may be easier to implement than 
taxes or auctioned permits, because the industry’s mitigation cost are less visible and 
less burdensome.  Further, free allocated permits alleviate forming majority coalitions 
by providing more control to regulate the distributional effects.26  
It may, however, also be the case that people do not like the uncertainty that goes 
along with new policies.  In this case, they will be more opposed than they should be.  
Of course, that argument may be moderated once one considers the active and powerful 
role lobbies, sometimes of small, but important constituencies, play in shaping the 
policy process and its outcomes.   
Taxes are frequently seen with scepticism.  Thus, introducing an emission tax has to 
be done carefully if a government does not want to lose its mandate with the next 
election.  As it is the case in a trading system the number of people who are directly 
affected by the tax will cause the acceptance of the tax and the chances for the 
government of re-election.  As additional taxes on emissions will increase the prices of 
different goods, amongst others electricity, nearly all people are affected at least 
indirectly by such a policy.27   
                                                 
26 With regard to the political economy of market-based environmental policy, we refer the reader to 
Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) who examine the political process of permit allocation within the U.S. 
Acid Rain Program. 
27 There is little systematic evidence on how people feel about environmental taxes.  Halla et al. (2008) 
analyze how satisfaction with democracy in European countries varies with environmental quality and 
policy.  They find that citizens in countries in time periods with higher environmental or energy taxes 
tend to be less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, but citizens are more satisfied if 
more environmental policies are enacted.  They explain this result with the fact that a measure of the 
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A hybrid policy is, as the trading policy, a strategy that is not well known among the 
broad population.  At least in terms of its principles, it can be “sold” as something other 
than a tax, giving it a natural advantage.  The empirical analysis by Pizer (2002) shows 
that a hybrid system is only little more efficient than a pure tax approach.  But with 
regard to political feasibility the hybrid policy may be favourable to a pure price-based 
approach because on the one hand it provides (in the case of gratis allocation) 
acceptance within the industry sector and on the other hand generates the possibility 
distribute the rents generated from the additionally sold emission allowances (Snyder 
Bennear and Stavins 2007).  It should thus be easier to implement it without too much 
protest in a bigger part of the population.  
The political enforceability of different systems can be very different from country 
to country.  On a general level, as Europeans are more used to taxes as a regulating 
instrument, it is easier to implement such a hybrid instrument compared to the United 
States where taxes are seen as an evil from the very first idea and a lot of work has to be 
done to convince people from the benefits of such a system.  From this perspective, it is 
quite puzzling that Europe adopted an emission trading program for CO2 in the first 
place.  
How much the public is concerned by a hybrid system depends on its design.  The 
number of companies or individuals who are affected depends on the approach that is 
used.  If an upstream approach is used, much fewer companies are affected because the 
system starts working at the top of the carbon chain, namely importers and producers of 
fossil fuels while a downstream approach affects many companies and individuals as 
the duty of providing certificates is shifted into the direction of the end-users (Boemare 
and Quirion 2002).  Furthermore, the choice of sectors that are regulated by a trading 
system affects the public. It makes a difference if only the energy sector is captured by 
an emission trading system or if public and especially private transports are included.  
From the political side, the innovation strategy seems to be the easiest one to 
implement.  Companies are not faced with any binding reduction targets or taxes and 
therefore prices for energy and products which require fossil resources do not increase 
as a result of the policy.  As technological progress and innovation is a positive sign for 
an economy political authorities will find it easy to support R&D without compromising 
                                                                                                                                               
quality of democracy is how well it resolves collective action problems, but that by and large individuals 
prefer not to pay for environmental quality.     
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their chances for the next election campaign.  However, once one thinks about the 
second part of the innovation strategy, namely, the coordination of technology transfer, 
one becomes more doubtful about the ease of implementation.  Loosely speaking, every 
country has an incentive to free-ride.  Worse, that incentive is not only present in the 
technology-sharing phase, but already in the innovation phase.  In the worst case, all 
incentives for technological progress might evaporate.    
3.3 Financial impacts 
Financial impact in this context means how consumers in a country with a regulation 
policy are affected of this policy in monetary circumstances. As all policies increase 
costs of companies more or less, the question is how companies will pass on these costs 
to consumers. 
The practical experience with emission trading in the European Union has shown 
that, although emission certificates were allocated for free, companies have integrated 
the costs for certificates as opportunity costs into their calculation and prices have 
increased (Woerdman 2001). That is what we have seen in practice since the start of the 
European emission trading scheme, especially in the electricity sector. Sijm et al. (2006) 
show by empirical estimates that the pass-through rates of costs of CO2 allowances for 
the power sectors in Germany and the Netherlands varies between 60 and 100% 
depending on the carbon intensity of the marginal production unit and various other 
market- or technology-specific factors.  The German “Verband der Industriellen 
Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft” reported in May 2006 that the German energy sector 
makes an annual surplus of €5 bn. by including the price of certificates into their 
electricity price calculation (Kraftwirtschaft 2006). For the UK, calculations show an 
increase of the wholesale power prices of £3,50 - £10,50 / MWh over the forecast 
period to 2020 as a result of these windfall profits.28  This should increase the profit of 
the UK power generation sector by £800 m per year (Industry 2005). In theory, the 
ecological effects of regulation and the financial impacts should be the same as with a 
tax policy and who has to bear the additional costs should depend on the slope of the 
respective supply and demand curve.  
In the hybrid system the same logic applies. Companies are faced with higher costs 
as a result of the policy, and they may be able to pass on the costs. Whether companies 
                                                 
28 On January 21st 2010, the exchange rate was £1 ≈ US$1.62. 
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or consumers are paying the bigger part again depends on the slope of the demand and 
supply curves.   
For the R&D policy it is difficult to predict the financial impacts. First they depend 
on who is financing R&D, government or companies. If we talk about public financed 
R&D, it is clear that it has to be financed through taxes. Thus taxes have to be either 
increased (which is frequently distortionary and thus creates social costs) or public 
expansions have to be cut in other areas to leave taxes unchanged.  Firms can engage in 
R&D on their own to realize comparative advantages.  The government may also decide 
to motivate companies, if firms do not engage in a socially efficient level of R&D on 
their own.  As we will discuss in more detail in the next section, incentives for 
companies to start R&D activities can precisely come from an emission trading program 
or from taxes, both of which increase the price of emitting CO2 and force companies to 
find measures not to pay these additional costs.  
In terms of political feasibility, R&D promotion through lower taxes or tax 
deductions has the advantage of neutrality concerning decisions about the topic and the 
character of R&D-projects on the companies’ part. Taxation benefits are only a little 
barrier for companies to get in favour of financial support, which is especially important 
for small and middle sized companies. The conditions to get a benefit are transparent 
compared to other methods of public support, and for companies it is easy to plan 
because the rules of getting a tax reduction are known in advance (Hutschenreiter and 
Aiginger 2001).  However, in contrast to an innovation program where a fund is fixed 
for each period a tax incentive provides losses in tax revenues which lead to higher or 
new taxes to compensate this loss. 
3.4 Dynamic incentives 
Besides analyzing the static cost efficiency of environmental instruments also the 
generation of dynamic incentives to technological change and innovation play an 
important role whereas the innovation and cooperation strategy is not the only policy 
that requires the consideration of dynamic aspects.  Other policies should also be 
designed to encourage companies to improve their emission reduction techniques 
continuously.  Market-based policies such as tradable permits and taxes not only have 
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static cost-effectiveness advantages, but also dynamic incentive advantages.29  Snyder et 
al. (2003) show empirically that change of relative prices induced exogenously or by the 
implementation of a certain policy may provoke technological change and thus, the 
achievements of different policy instruments can vary.  In general, it is important to 
assess the effects of a pre-existing framework of regulation while evaluating the effects 
of alternative instruments on technology innovation and diffusion.    
An emission tax provides a continuous incentive for reducing emissions, because 
every unit of emission that is not emitted saves money for the company.  As long as 
reduction measures are cheaper than paying the tax, companies will engage in research 
to reduce emissions or adopt existing emissions-reducing technologies.  An emission 
trading systems provides, in principle, the same dynamic incentive as a tax system. 
Every unit of emission a company does not emit provides an additional certificate 
saleable on the market.  Thus, companies are interested in reducing emissions because it 
also reduces their costs. 
But within the analysis of an emission trading system with respect to the dynamic 
incentives a distinction regarding the possible allocation metrics has to be made.  Under 
the assumption that the diffusion of new technologies reduces the demand of permits 
relative to the supply and therefore also the permit price, grandfathering diminishes the 
incentive of emitters covered by the system to evolve environmental innovations.  The 
higher the diffusion of new technologies, the higher the value of the permit and the 
benefits from selling surplus permits is reduced so that a free allocation constrains the 
dynamic incentives.  By contrast, the auctioning of permits generates the incentive to 
use new technology because in the long run costs from purchasing permits can be 
reduced (Milliman and Prince 1989).    
As a hybrid system combines tax and trade systems it also has the dynamic 
incentive of continually increasing reduction efforts. As in the two former cases the 
dynamic as a whole depends on the price.  The higher the price or the tax the longer a 
dynamic incentive to reduce emissions is given.  
                                                 
29 Other policies should also be designed to lead companies to improve their emission reduction 
techniques continuously.  Recall that in the case of an emission standard companies do not have any 
incentive to improve their technology once the level set by the authority is reached.  This policy, which is 
not part of this paper, has no dynamic incentive at all.  For an empirical analysis concerning the dynamic 
incentives of environmental regulation by taxes, technology adoption subsidies and technology standards 
we refer the reader to Jaffe and Stavins (1995). 
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The dynamic incentives of the innovation strategy depend on the design of the R&D 
policy. If R&D is supported by national authorities the direction of R&D activities can 
be guided as well as the range of the different sectors that should be covered by the 
activities.  The dynamic incentive or the incentive to permanently increase the level of 
technology depends in some way on the will of the authority and the financial support it 
is providing to R&D.  If a national authority is interested in a permanent technological 
improvement, the financial, organisational and political background must be provided.  
If these preconditions are set, the chances for a permanent progress in environmental 
technology are given. 
4 Dealing with uncertainty 
As discussed earlier, both emission permits and taxes are cost-effective instruments, i.e., 
they allow society to achieve a specified quantity or price goal at minimum cost.  We 
have discussed earlier how the economic efficiency of emission permits and taxes 
depends on the quality of information the regulator has about benefits and costs, and 
how hybrid instruments have been proposed to combine the best of both.  For the 
innovation and cooperation strategy, it is much more difficult to predict even 
theoretically what will happen, simply because innovations are, by nature, hard to 
predict.  There is a very strongly market-based tool that allows feasible policy decisions 
precisely in such a context which is called “prediction markets.”   
It has long been known that speculative markets do a great job of aggregating 
relevant information.  In fact, they often perform better than forecasting institutions.  
Already Roll (1984) pointed out that orange juice futures improve on weather forecasts.  
Horse race markets beat horse race experts (Figlewski 1979).  The Economic 
Derivatives market run by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank outperforms economists 
in predicting economic outcomes (Gürkayanak and Wolfers 2005).  Oscar markets (e.g., 
the Hollywood Stock Exchange) make more accurate predictions than columnists 
(Pennock, Giles and Nielsen 2001).  Both real and play-money markets have generated 
more accurate forecasts of the likely winners of NFL football games than all but a 
handful among 2000 self-professed experts (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004).  Election 
markets beat national opinion polls (Berg, Nelson and Rietz 2001).  And corporate sales 
markets beat corporate sales forecasts (Chen and Plott 1988).  Prediction markets have 
also been applied to forecast influenza outbreaks (Nelson, Neumann and Polgreen 
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2006).  In all of these cases, we are in a similar position as we are when trying to predict 
which technology will next be invented and adopted in the case of technology that 
allows us to diminish greenhouse gases.   
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008) provide a survey of recent research on prediction 
markets.  Scholars have considered how to translate market prices as probabilities, for 
example (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005).  Intuitively, if more people expect a (well-
specified) event will happen, more people will buy an asset that pays off 100 if that 
event happens.  For example, suppose we construct a market where an asset is traded 
that pays off 100 if the average CO2 emissions of cars fall below 50g/km.  It is unknown 
if and when such a technology becomes available.  However, the market price of such 
an asset is likely to give policymakers and other firms a good indication of how likely it 
is.  Obviously, there are many implementation issues to be dealt with in this context, 
e.g., what is the exact sample of cars that is considered; is it just prototypes that count 
(in the spirit of Schumpeter’s innovation stage) or is it only mass-produced cars; etc.  
Hanson (2003) shows that even though there may be many thousands or millions of 
combinations of events that a market might trade, it is still feasible to construct a liquid 
and informative market.  Finally, issues of moral hazard (while having played an role in 
the closing of the Policy Analysis Market in the US in July 2003 (Hanson 2006)) are 
generally not seen as insurmountable obstacles.   
Another issue may also be of concern to policymakers.  In some sense, prediction 
markets establish a derivative market in that the price of the entity being traded depends 
on the probability that the “underlying,” namely, the technology comes into existence.  
There is a long, but inconclusive discussion in finance and economics whether the 
introduction of derivatives, such as futures, leads to increased volatility of the 
underlying.  Some have found such an effect; others the opposite; yet others have found 
no effect.30  Consider the introduction of a prediction market in a market where firms 
are already subject to a tradable permit system, such as a in Europe.  Conceptually, what 
might happen is that the technology prediction market leads to more volatile views on 
                                                 
30  Seminal contributions showing an increase in spot price volatility due to derivatives trading include 
Figlewski (1981), Stein (1987), Harris (1989) and Lee and Ohk (1992).  By contrast, Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1992) and Brown-Hruska and Kurserk (1995) provide evidence suggesting that active futures 
markets are associated with decreased stock market volatility.  Finally, Santoni (1987), Edwards (1988a) 
and Edwards (1988b) find that daily and weekly volatilities of the S&P 500 are not different after the 
introduction of futures.  Darrat and Rahman (1995) and Darrat et al. (2002) also found no correlation of 
S&P 500 and DJIA jump volatility with derivatives trading.   
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abatement technologies, thus leading to more volatile emission permit prices.  There is, 
to our knowledge, no study that specifically addresses this concern in the context of 
prediction markets.  An overall assessment of this consequence would also have to 
determine what economic costs arise from more volatile emission permit market prices 
and how they compare to the benefits obtained from the prediction market.  In 
particular, firms may suffer from more volatile spot prices.  However, volatilities can be 
hedged with appropriate instruments, and the cost to firms would therefore consist 
primarily in the costs of the hedge.  (Chesney and Taschini (2008) provide an approach 
for CO2 option pricing, for example.)  As the market for options on emission permits 
grows more liquid, this cost decreases, but it will still remain an important factor.  
Understanding the overall welfare effects of prediction markets in this specific context 
thus remains an important area for research.   
In short, prediction markets in principle appear as an extremely important 
complement to other market-based policies for combating environmental problems that 
are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty.  The one potential drawback seems to be 
an increased volatility of emission permit prices, although existing research indicates 
that it is far from certain that derivatives are responsible for increased spot market 
volatility.  More detailed analysis of this possibility must be left for future research, but 
it seems clear that especially the innovation-based strategy would tremendously benefit 
from being accompanied by a market-based forecast of technological innovation and 
diffusion.   
5 Conclusions 
All three basic strategies that are presented in this paper show a potential for addressing 
climate change.  Emission trading has a clear goal concerning the reduction of 
emissions as the overall cap of allowed emissions is set at the beginning. 
Environmentalists may favor emission trading from a purely ecological viewpoint, 
because with help of the cap it is possible to control the total amount of emissions.  
Controlling the amount of emissions is more difficult using an emission tax. In this case 
the regulator has to have information about marginal abatement costs of the individual 
companies and the whole economy. This information is hardly known, so that the 
optimal tax rate to achieve a certain target has to be set in a trial and error process, 
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which is hard to implement from a political point of view.  Because there is much 
evidence that the marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefit curve in the 
context of climate change, efficiency considerations at first favor taxes, but a hybrid 
system, i.e., a permit system with a safety valve, may do very well, too.  We have 
discussed how the different instruments can be evaluated with respect to various 
criteria.  Importantly, they are all cost-effective, but they vary with respect to ecological 
effectiveness, financial impacts, dynamic aspects, and political feasibility.  The 
substantial advantages of the hybrid approach, on a theoretical, practical, and politic-
economic level lead us to regard this instrument as very promising for the post-2012 
period in Europe.   
On the international level, climate change is combated by the Kyoto-Protocol, an 
international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change 
between industrialized, emerging, and developing nations.  The Protocol’s major feature 
is the provision of binding targets for industrialized countries for reducing GHG 
emissions to an amount of an average of 5% against 1990 levels over the five year 
period 2008-2012.  However, the implementation of the Kyoto-Protocol has been 
criticized by economists with respect to the missing participation of key countries of the 
global GHG emission, the short time path of action and the inexistence of firm-level 
market-based policy instruments (Olmstead and Stavins 2008).  Key principles 
regarding the negotiation process of a post Kyoto agreement are the establishment of a 
global cap-and-trade-approach connecting regional and national tradable permit systems 
and consequently integrating developing countries.  Further, a harmonization of 
domestic actions to combat climate change should be induced by a portfolio of 
international treaties and an international adjustment of carbon taxes. Besides the 
development of a particular climate policy framework, the promotion of technology 
transfers and deforestation, the reformation of Kyoto’s CDM (Clean Development 
Mechanism) and a linkage between global climate policy and global trade policy are 
inevitable issues of a future arrangement (Aldy and Stavins 2008). 
We have also given an economic interpretation of the ideas expressed in the basic 
mission statement of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.  
This partnership intends to promote technology as a way to deal with global 
environmental problems.  Probing deeper, one recognizes that the drivers of all three 
Schumpeterian phases of technological progress – invention, innovation, and diffusion – 
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are incentives.  Promoting clean energy alone with good will most likely is not going to 
be enough as long as fossil energy is cheaper. Therefore using taxes or trading to make 
fossil energy more expansive is a way to set an incentive that helps to develop cleaner 
technology quicker than it would without such financial incentives.  A useful 
complement to emission taxes and emission permits are subsidies and quantity-based 
tools that promote technological progress.  To our knowledge, no analysis equivalent to 
the many studies analyzing optimal emission taxes and permits is available for the 
subsidies approach.   
Existing studies have a hard time incorporating the notion that technology will 
change over time.  More generally, environmental policy, in particular such long-term 
policy as that related to climate change, has to struggle with the significant uncertainty 
surrounding benefits, costs, and available technologies.  Environmental effects of 
technologies in development can be estimated but not predicted for sure.  From the 
experience of such diverse areas as weather forecasts, horserace betting, 
macroeconomic variables, and elections, we know today that “prediction markets” – i.e., 
markets where assets are traded whose value depends on the probability that a certain 
event happens – can play a powerful role in providing effective advice.  In particular, 
they can aggregate information, often more accurately than experts can.  While this 
market could conceivably lead to more volatile emission permit prices, the potential 
advantages available by a more effective knowledge and information aggregation 
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